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SCHUETTE AND ANTIBALKANIZATION
Samuel Weiss* and Donald Kinder**
ABSTRACT
In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Justice Kennedy’s con-
trolling plurality revised the political process doctrine and ended the practice of
affirmative action in Michigan. In this opinion, Kennedy followed in the Court’s
tradition of invoking antibalkanization values in equal protection cases, making the
empirical claims both that antibalkanization motivated the campaign to end affirma-
tive action in Michigan and that the campaign itself would, absent judicial interven-
tion, have antibalkanizing effects.
Using sophisticated empirical methods, this Article is the first to examine whether
the Court’s claims on antibalkanization are correct. We find they are not. Support for
the Michigan ballot initiative banning affirmative action arose principally from feelings
of racial resentment, not a desire for racial comity. The ballot initiative did not mitigate
racial divisiveness but did just the opposite, exacerbating racial division in the state. We
conclude by considering what Schuette and these empirical findings mean for affirma-
tive action, for the political process doctrine, and for the antibalkanization principle.
INTRODUCTION
On November 7, 2006, the voters of the State of Michigan enshrined into their
constitution an amendment that prohibited the use of affirmative action in higher
education admissions.1 The voter-ballot initiative, “Proposal 2,” passed with approx-
imately 58% of the vote after a year of contentious debate.2 Civil rights groups quickly
filed suit, alleging that the amendment violated the Federal Constitution’s Equal
Protection Clause under the political restructuring doctrine, which forbids states from
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of the data and analysis here first appeared in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014), and we thank
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The brief can be read in its entirety at Brief of Amici Curiae Political Scientists Donald R.
Kinder, et al. in Support of Respondents, Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (No. 12-682).
1 See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d
924, 930 (E.D. Mich. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc),
rev’d sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
2 Id. at 931.
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placing undue burdens on minority groups’ access to the political process.3 Nearly
eight years later, the United States Supreme Court concluded the litigation by finding
in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action4 that the amendment banning
affirmative action was constitutionally permissible.5
Justice Kennedy’s controlling plurality began by reiterating the existence of the
political restructuring doctrine but limiting its application.6 This move was foresee-
able given the ambiguous scope of the political restructuring doctrine and the am-
bitious claim of the amendment’s challengers—that affirmative action, a practice the
Court “barely tolerate[d],”7 would receive Constitutional protection from a direct
vote seeking to eliminate it.
Kennedy concluded his opinion with a lengthy ode to the merits of political de-
bate, particularly on the contentious issue of race.8 He wrote:
An informed public can, and must, rise above [racial division].
The idea of democracy is that it can, and must, mature. Freedom
embraces the right, indeed the duty, to engage in a rational, civic
discourse in order to determine how best to form a consensus to
shape the destiny of the Nation and its people.9
Amidst the soaring rhetoric in his coda, Kennedy made two empirical claims on
the relationship between voters and Proposal 2. First, Kennedy claimed that the
Amendment arose from opposition to racial divisiveness.10 It “was adopted, we must
assume, because the voters deemed a preference system to be unwise, on account of
what voters may deem its latent potential to become itself a source of the very re-
sentments and hostilities based on race that this Nation seeks to put behind it.”11
Second, Kennedy claimed that citizens respond to campaigns like the ones for
and against Proposal 2 by speaking, debating, and learning before acting.12 Rational
deliberation “rise[s] above” racial divisiveness.13 Judicial intervention into this sen-
sitive area would invite “rancor or discord based on race” while public debate would
“avoid” it.14
3 See id. at 932–34.
4 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (plurality opinion).
5 Id. at 1638.
6 Id. at 1634.
7 David E. Bernstein, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action and the Failed
Attempt to Square a Circle, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 210, 212 (2013).
8 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636–38 (plurality opinion).
9 Id. at 1637.
10 Id. at 1638.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 1626.
13 Id. at 1637.
14 Id. at 1635.
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Kennedy’s empirical claims about the relationship between public referenda and
racial sentiments may appear tangential to the political restructuring doctrine, but
they are consistent with a line of Fourteenth Amendment cases that “reason[ ] from
antibalkanization values.”15 The decisive opinions in a number of the most signifi-
cant race cases of the past several decades have upheld racial classifications but re-
stricted them, expressly demonstrating the concern for social disharmony that “both
extreme racial stratification and unconstrained racial remedies can engender.”16 Anti-
balkanization as a Fourteenth Amendment principle helps to explain why in 2003 the
Court forbade quantitative affirmative action for the University of Michigan’s under-
graduate admissions but permitted qualitative affirmative action in its law school
admissions,17 and why race-conscious remedies have been held permissible in school
desegregation cases where facially racial remedies were not.18
Early in 2006, as the Proposal 2 campaign began to gather steam, one of us, as
a political scientist, was interested in the same questions of the relationship between
public campaigns and racial sentiments that years later would occupy the Court.
Kinder and his colleague Nancy Burns designed a pair of coordinated and simulta-
neous surveys, one carried out in the state of Michigan, the other carried out in the
country as a whole.19 Polimetrix, Inc., of Palo Alto, California, conducted interviews
with representative samples of the Michigan and American electorates, before and
then again after the 2006 elections.20 Both studies included batteries of standard mea-
sures of political and racial attitudes.21
Analysis of the two surveys enables us to carry out a sharp test of Kennedy’s
empirical claims. Both are incorrect. First, we show that the vote on Proposal 2 cannot
be understood as a decision to prohibit affirmative action in the interests of racial
comity. On the contrary, whites and blacks were deeply divided over Proposal 2;22
white support came principally from feelings of racial resentment;23 and black op-
position came principally from feelings of racial solidarity.24 Second, contrary to
Kennedy’s claim, the Proposal 2 campaign did not rise above racial divisiveness but
had just the opposite effect.25 As they moved to the polls, whites and blacks alike
15 Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1278 (2011).
16 Id.
17 Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), with Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244 (2003).
18 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
19 See infra Part II.
20 See infra Part II.
21 See infra Part II.
22 See infra Part II.
23 See infra Part II; Table 2.
24 See infra Part II; Tables 3 & 4.
25 See discussion infra Part II.
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were more divided, and more consumed by considerations of race, than they would
have been in the absence of a campaign.26
Part I of this Article describes Schuette and the history of the antibalkanization
principle. Part II provides the background and methodology of our empirical findings
and details our results. Part III considers the aftermath of Schuette.
I. SCHUETTE AND THE ANTIBALKANIZATION PRINCIPLE
In the spring of 2003, for the first time in a generation, the Supreme Court heard
arguments over affirmative action in university admissions.27 In a pair of cases, white
students denied admission to the University of Michigan’s undergraduate college
and law school sued the University, arguing that the affirmative action provisions
in the University’s admissions procedures violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.28
The University argued that its admissions policies were narrowly tailored, and that
they were in the service of advancing the State’s compelling interest in racial diversity
in educational environments.29 Microsoft, General Motors, IBM, and scores of the
country’s most important corporations urged the Court to uphold the University’s ad-
missions plans.30 A group of retired military leaders, including Norman Schwarzkopf
and Wesley Clark, filed a brief arguing that affirmative action in the service acade-
mies, ROTC, and the military was indispensable to an effective fighting force.31
By a vote of 6–3, the Court declared the University’s undergraduate policy un-
constitutional.32 Chief Justice Rehnquist issued the majority opinion.33 Race can be
taken into account, the Chief Justice declared, but it cannot be a “decisive” factor.34
The undergraduate policy was insufficiently narrowly tailored and therefore uncon-
stitutional.35 At the same time, by a vote of 5–4, the Court ruled in favor of the law
school’s policy.36 Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor argued,
“[i]n order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it
is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified in-
dividuals of every race and ethnicity.”37 Furthermore, O’Connor wrote, “the Equal
Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race
26 See discussion infra Part II.
27 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
28 Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (law school); Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (undergraduate).
29 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327–28, 334.
30 See, e.g., id. at 330–31.
31 See id. at 331.
32 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251.
33 Id. at 249.
34 Id. at 270–72.
35 Id. at 275.
36 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
37 Id. at 332.
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in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational
benefits that flow from a diverse student body.”38
Two weeks after the Court issued its decisions, Ward Connerly announced the
formation of an organization to place an initiative on the Michigan ballot that would
prohibit the use of race in admissions and hiring throughout the state.39 Connerly,
a successful businessman and a critic of affirmative action, was instrumental both in
ending affirmative action at the University of California in 1996 and in spearheading
the successful passage of Proposition 209 a year later, which eliminated affirmative
action from all public employment, education, and contracting in the State of Cali-
fornia.40 Connerly’s organization collected the requisite number of signatures, thereby
placing the “Michigan Civil Rights Initiative” (MCRI) on the state’s November 2006
ballot as Proposal 2.41 The MCRI proposed that neither the state nor any public
school shall “discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin in the operation of
public employment, public education, or public contracting.”42 The MCRI passed,
winning 57.9% of the vote.43
The next day, the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action filed suit challenging the
MCRI, claiming that it was a straightforward violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
as its intent was to reduce the population of African-American, Latino, and female
students.44 The activist group supplemented this ambitious claim with others, arguing
that Proposal 2 violated the First Amendment and was preempted by both the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of 1972.45 A month later, another group of students and
faculty filed suit against the law, represented by a litany of mainstream progressive
legal organizations including the American Civil Liberties Union and the National
38 Id. at 343.
39 Ritu Kelotra, Affirmative Action Efforts Strong in 2003: Connerly Goes to Michigan,
LEADERSHIP CONF. (Jan. 13, 2004), https://web.archive.org/web/20061127082312/https://
civilrights.org/issues/affirmative/details.cfm?id=17854.
40 See About Mr. Ward Connerly, AM. C.R. INST., http://acri.org/about-ward-connerly/
[https://perma.cc/7UCU-WRVL] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
41 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 924,
931 (E.D. Mich. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc),
rev’d sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). The
signature-gathering process was not without controversy of its own, as the MCRI engaged
in voter fraud by telling signers of the petitions and even some of its own volunteers that the
Initiative supported affirmative action, instead of prohibiting it. See Operation King’s Dream
v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006).
42 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 931.
43 Id.
44 Plaintiff Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action et al.’s (BAMN’s) Second Amended
Class-Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 20–21, Coalition, 539 F.
Supp. 2d 924 (No. 06-15637).
45 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 935.
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Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and constitutional law profes-
sors Erwin Chemerinsky and Lawrence Tribe.46 The District Court quickly consoli-
dated the two cases.47
The second group of plaintiffs brought a more modest challenge to Proposal 2
as applied to university admissions, claiming that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause’s “political restructuring” doctrine by not merely banning affirmative action
but also changing the political process by which the decision could be undone.48 The
Supreme Court had first articulated the doctrine in Hunter v. Erickson.49 The City of
Akron, Ohio, had enacted a fair housing ordinance to forbid racial discrimination.50
In response to the ordinance, the citizens of Akron amended the city charter to require
a majority vote in a referendum before any ordinance could regulate racial discrimi-
nation in housing.51 The Supreme Court found that this amendment, despite being
facially neutral, singled out the issue of race from any other form of property regu-
lation and was therefore itself a racial classification.52 As Akron had no compelling
government interest in how it had structured the political process, the Court struck
down the amendment as unconstitutional.53
The Supreme Court took up the doctrine again in Washington v. Seattle School
District No. 1.54 In March 1978, the School Board of the Seattle School District had
adopted the “Seattle Plan,” which sought to eliminate racial isolation in its schools
through an aggressive desegregation program.55 Opponents of the plan placed Ini-
tiative 350 on the Washington ballot, which sought to eliminate forced busing for
racial integration.56 In November 1978, the voters of the State of Washington passed
Initiative 350 “by a substantial margin.”57
46 Id. at 929.
47 Id. at 932. The tension between the activist and mainstream organizations continued
all the way to the United States Supreme Court, where time for oral argument was split
between the two organizations. See [Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action] Oral
Argument, C-SPAN (Oct. 15, 2013), https://www.c-span.org/video/transcript/?id=53815
[https://perma.cc/4L8H-Z247]. The Coalition’s demand for a reinterpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment clashed with the ACLU’s more modest argument that a straightforward appli-
cation of the political process doctrine would render Proposal 2 unconstitutional. See id.
48 See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 933.
49 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
50 Id. at 386.
51 Id. at 387.
52 Id. at 391–92.
53 Id. at 392–93.
54 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
55 Id. at 461.
56 Id. at 463.
57 Id. The full text of this ballot measure is available online through the Washington
Secretary of State: https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i350.pdf [https://perma
.cc/UXP8-9WYQ] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
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The Court found Initiative 350 unconstitutional under the same principle articu-
lated in Hunter.58 While “all other student assignment decisions, as well as . . . most
other areas of educational policy, remain[ed] vested in the local school board,” those
seeking an end to school desegregation had to seek relief from a higher, statewide
body.59 The Initiative thus “remove[d] the authority to address a racial problem—
and only a racial problem—from the existing decisionmaking body,” restructuring
the political process “to burden minority interests.”60
To the second group of plaintiffs, the challenge to Proposal 2 required only a
straightforward application of Hunter and Seattle.61 Michigan’s Constitution states
that an elected Board of Regents will control each of the state’s public universities,
with “general supervision of its institution and the control and direction of all expen-
ditures from the institution’s funds.”62 Proposal 2 took away one decision, and only
one decision, from the Regents: whether to use affirmative action in admissions.63
While advocates for changes in how the University of Michigan admitted athletes,
musicians, or legacy students could go straight to the Regents, advocates for affirma-
tive action were forced to take the much more arduous step of repealing a constitu-
tional amendment.64 Proposal 2 therefore did not merely ban affirmative action—it
singled out affirmative action for a separate political process.65 This singling out was
itself a racial classification, and the State had failed to provide a compelling govern-
mental interest for its political restructuring.66
The Eastern District of Michigan agreed with many of plaintiffs’ premises: that
the governance of a university is part of the political process; that a political restruc-
turing claim requires no finding of intentional discrimination; and that Proposal 2
had a racial focus.67 But the court disagreed overall, based on one critical distinction
between the laws at issue in Hunter and Seattle and in the present case.68 Unlike the
policies at issue in Hunter and Seattle, affirmative action did not protect against un-
equal treatment on the basis of race but instead sought advantageous treatment on the
basis of race.69 There was a “fundamental[ ]” difference, the court argued, between
58 Seattle, 458 U.S. at 474.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See generally Brief for Respondents Chase Cantrell et al. at 4, Schuette v. Coal. to
Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (No. 12-682), 2013 WL 4587968.
62 MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5.
63 See Brief for Respondents Chase Cantrell et al., supra note 61, at 5.
64 See id.
65 See id. at 2 (stating that the Sixth Circuit determined that Proposal 2 “effected a sig-
nificant change in the ordinary political process and that it was fundamentally about race”).
66 See id. at 6.
67 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 924,
955–57 (E.D. Mich. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 701 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc),
rev’d sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
68 See id. at 953–58.
69 Id. at 956–57.
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“affirmative action programs not mandated by the obligation to cure past discrimina-
tion” and “laws intended to protect against discrimination.”70 Restructuring the polit-
ical process to prevent minorities from obtaining equal protection was prohibited,
but restructuring the political process to prevent minorities from obtaining advanta-
geous treatment was not.71
The Sixth Circuit reversed.72 Judge Guy Cole found no meaningful distinction be-
tween the prohibition of preferential treatment and the prohibition of discrimination.73
As there is no freestanding right to be free of discrimination, the district court’s dis-
tinction essentially meant that an enactment violates the political restructuring doctrine
only if it undermines state action that is constitutionally mandatory as opposed to
constitutionally permissible.74 The behavior in both Hunter and Seattle, however,
was not mandatory.75 The Court in Hunter found that neither the 1968 Civil Rights
Act nor traditional equal protection analysis decided the case.76 The busing in Seattle
was even more clearly constitutionally permissible state action, as the desegregation
effort was a voluntary, ameliorative measure designed to reduce the impact of de
facto desegregation.77 And indeed, it is only logical that the political restructuring
doctrine would cover legislation in the interest of minorities, not simply legislation
designed to stamp out already unconstitutional action.78 Otherwise, Cole wrote, the
doctrine would be nothing but a “backstop against already unconstitutional action.”79
The Sixth Circuit en banc affirmed for the same reasons, with Cole again writing
for the majority.80 Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing, like the district court, for a distinc-
tion between racial and gender preferences and other laws that inure to the interest
70 Id. at 957.
71 Id. The court also dismissed the conventional Equal Protection challenge from the
other group of plaintiffs, holding that there was no discriminatory intent from the people of
the State of Michigan. Id. at 952 (“Proposal 2 was a ballot initiative. To impugn the motives
of 58% of Michigan’s electorate, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances which do not
exist here, simply is not warranted on this record.”).
72 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 652 F.3d 607, 610
(6th Cir. 2011) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action,
134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
73 Id. at 626.
74 Id. at 627 (differentiating between constitutionally mandated “discrimination” and con-
stitutionally permissible “preference”).
75 Id. at 627–28.
76 Id. at 627 (citing Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 388–89 (1969)).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 629.
79 Id. Finding Proposal 2 unconstitutional under the political restructuring doctrine, the
Sixth Circuit did not reach the question of whether it was unconstitutional under a traditional
Equal Protection analysis. Id. at 631.
80 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 470
(6th Cir. 2012) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action,
134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
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of minorities through banning discrimination.81 Seattle, she argued, only failed to
make this point explicitly because of changes in the law after the case was decided.82
Seattle concerned a racially conscious student assignment system, which while con-
stitutional at the time, would in later cases be held to be subject to strict scrutiny and
almost certainly struck down.83 The Court in Seattle had therefore, with its different
premises, failed to make the obvious inference that presumptively invalid preference
programs, constitutional in only the most limited circumstances, did not receive the
same protections from political restructuring that antidiscrimination laws like those
in Akron did.84
Judge Sutton also dissented, raising an interesting hypothetical: Michigan inter-
prets its state equal protection clause to require race-based classifications to survive
strict scrutiny, just as the federal one does.85 If the state was to interpret the state
clause as broader than the analogous one,86 it might reasonably decide to invalidate
any racial preferences in university admissions.87 Were the Michigan Supreme Court
to do so, the outcome would be identical—while the Regents would make all other
decisions regarding admissions, affirmative action could only return with an amend-
ment to the state constitution.88 Judge Griffin went further in dissent, writing that the
political restructuring doctrine, mentioned in only a few Supreme Court cases ever,
should be consigned to the annals of judicial history.89
The Supreme Court reversed.90 Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito and Chief Justice
Roberts, wrote the controlling plurality.91 The plurality made a doctrinal argument
81 Id. at 494 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 496–97 (“Seattle did not consider that the underlying policy affected by the
challenged enactment was presumptively invalid.”).
83 See id. at 496 (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 720 (2007)).
84 See id.
85 Id. at 509–10 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (arguing that requiring “a member of a racial
minority who wants a governmental privilege [to] . . . identify a compelling state interest that
supports its provision” is required by the Equal Protection Clause and the plaintiffs’ asser-
tions therefore “cannot be right”).
86 For the argument that states should look to cognate clauses in their own constitutions to
seek broader rights than their equivalents in the federal constitution, although not in the context
imagined here, see generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection
of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). The logic is particularly compelling in
areas, like education, in which federal courts are tepid in approach due to federalism concerns.
See Samuel Weiss, Note, Into the Breach: The Case for Robust Noncapital Proportionality
Review Under State Constitutions, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 569, 591 (2014).
87 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 509 (Sutton, J., dissenting).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 512 (Griffin, J., dissenting).
90 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014) (plu-
rality opinion).
91 Id. at 1629.
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first,92 then an appeal to broader principles.93 On the doctrinal front, Kennedy recast
the political process cases in a different light.94 As to Hunter, he wrote, “Central to
the Court’s reasoning in Hunter was that the charter amendment was enacted in cir-
cumstances where widespread racial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing
led to segregated housing.”95 Hunter, Kennedy wrote, “rests on the unremarkable
principle that the State may not alter the procedures of government to target racial
minorities.”96 The principle is unremarkable but is not what Hunter rested on;
Hunter could have relied on a traditional equal protection analysis if it had found
that the city had targeted racial minorities, by altering procedures or otherwise.97 It
did not.98 Instead, the Court struck down the amendment to the city’s charter because
of how it had structured an internal government process on the subject of race, regard-
less of the intention in its enactment.99
Kennedy’s treatment of Seattle was more dubious still. He wrote that the case
“[wa]s best understood as [one] in which the state action in question (the bar on busing
enacted by the State’s voters) had the serious risk, if not purpose, of causing specific
injuries on account of race.”100 He later wrote that the Court “found that the State’s
disapproval of the school board’s busing remedy was an aggravation of the very racial
injury in which the State itself was complicit.”101 As David Bernstein notes, however,
92 Id. at 1629–36.
93 Id. at 1636–38.
94 See id. at 1629–36 (summarizing a history of the Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence).
95 Id. at 1632.
96 Id.
97 See generally Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
98 See id. at 396–97 (Black, J., dissenting) (protesting the use of the Equal Protection
Clause to bar the States from repealing laws that courts want the states to retain).
99 David E. Bernstein notes that Kennedy could have reached a similar result by a slightly
different route by simply stating that while the Supreme Court could have and did not ex-
plicitly state that the referenda in question were both motivated by discriminatory intent and
had discriminatory effects, it was its underlying rationale, rendering the case a traditional
equal protection case. David E. Bernstein, “Reverse Carolene Products,” the End of the
Second Reconstruction, and Other Thoughts on Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 261, 264.
For approximately 34 years, the Supreme Court saw as part of its mis-
sion an alliance with the civil rights movement in general—and more
specifically with the aspirations of African Americans for full and equal
citizenship. But the Court did so not with fiery denunciations of southern
or general American racism and by threatening to upend the entire sys-
tem to combat that racism, but by inventing novel doctrines that allowed
the movement to succeed incrementally. The advent of the political
process doctrine should be understood in that context.
Id. at 280.
100 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1633 (plurality opinion).
101 Id.
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the opinion in Seattle “betrays no indication that the Court saw the case as involving
the narrow issue of targeting minorities through political restructuring, rather than
as involving the invalidation of legislation that inures to the benefit of minorities via
political restructuring.”102
Kennedy only got to this reading of Seattle through significant revisionism. He
found that although technically there had been no finding of de jure segregation in
Seattle, “it appears as though school segregation in the district in the 1940’s and 1950’s
may have been the partial result of school board policies.”103 This was simply not the
holding of Seattle, as the validity of the busing plan did not rely on a court’s finding
of de jure segregation.104 As Scalia wrote, concurring in the judgment, “this describes
what our opinion in Seattle might have been, but assuredly not what it was.”105
Having revised the history of the political process doctrine, Kennedy went on to
revise its test. In Seattle, the Court had held that strict scrutiny is required whenever
(1) a state policy inures primarily for the benefit of the minority; (2) minority groups
consider it to be in their interest; and (3) a state action places effective decision-making
authority over that policy at a higher level of government.106 Kennedy, calling this
straightforward articulation of the case “the broad reading of Seattle,” wrote that “that
reading must be rejected.”107 An additional prong, reread into Hunter and Seattle, was
that the laws have the serious risk or purpose of causing injury on account of race.108
The Court left unclear what exactly is an injury on account of race. The Court’s
position “that the fact that many of the minority applicants who would have gained
admission to the state’s top universities no longer would be able to do so is a not a
‘specific injury on account of race,’ says a great deal about how the Court regards
affirmative action.”109 And with the test’s critical new term left undefined, it is un-
clear when the political process doctrine applies, if ever.110
After making his doctrinal argument, Kennedy continued his opinion by evok-
ing broader principles: with a lengthy account of the merits of political debate and
the dangers of judicial intervention on the subject of affirmative action.111 He wrote
102 Bernstein, supra note 99, at 267.
103 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1633 (plurality opinion).
104 See generally Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
105 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1642 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
106 Seattle, 458 U.S. at 472, 474.
107 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634 (plurality opinion).
108 Id.
109 Evan Gerstmann, Foreword: The Roberts Court in 2013–14—Looking Beyond the
Rhetoric, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 319, 333 (2014).
110 Fourteenth Amendment—Equal Protection Clause—Political-Process Doctrine—
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and
Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 128 HARV. L. REV. 281, 286 (2014)
(stating that Kennedy’s plurality leaves “unclear what is left” of the political-process doctrine
(quoting Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1664 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
111 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636–38 (plurality opinion).
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that an “inherent” risk in adopting the Seattle test was that “racial antagonisms and
conflict tend to arise” when courts define groups by race.112 “Racial division would
be validated, not discouraged, were the Seattle formulation . . . to remain in force.”113
He continued, “In the realm of policy discussions the regular give-and-take of de-
bate ought to be a context in which rancor or discord based on race are avoided, not
invited.”114 He also expressed concern that the Sixth Circuit potentially uprooted
political arrangements on affirmative action, one that “voters deem it wise to avoid
because of its divisive potential.”115
Kennedy continued by explaining that he believed that the rights at stake were not
only those of the plaintiffs, but also those of all citizens as participants in Michigan’s
democracy:
[C]itizens [have the right] to debate so they can learn and decide
and then, through the political process, act in concert to try to
shape the course of their own times and the course of a nation that
must strive always to make freedom ever greater and more secure.
Here Michigan voters acted in concert and statewide to seek con-
sensus and adopt a policy on a difficult subject against a historical
background of race in America that has been a source of tragedy
and persisting injustice. That history demands that we continue to
learn, to listen, and to remain open to new approaches if we are
to aspire always to a constitutional order in which all persons are
treated with fairness and equal dignity. Were the Court to rule that
the question addressed by Michigan voters is too sensitive or com-
plex to be within the grasp of the electorate; or that the policies
at issue remain too delicate to be resolved save by university offi-
cials or faculties, acting at some remove from immediate public
scrutiny and control; or that these matters are so arcane that the
electorate’s power must be limited because the people cannot pru-
dently exercise that power even after a full debate, that holding
would be an unprecedented restriction on the exercise of a fun-
damental right held not just by one person but by all in common.
It is the right to speak and debate and learn and then, as a matter
of political will, to act through a lawful electoral process.
The respondents in this case insist that a difficult question of
public policy must be taken from the reach of the voters, and thus
112 Id. at 1635.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1636.
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removed from the realm of public discussion, dialogue, and debate
in an election campaign. Quite in addition to the serious First
Amendment implications of that position with respect to any par-
ticular election, it is inconsistent with the underlying premises of
a responsible, functioning democracy. One of those premises is
that a democracy has the capacity—and the duty—to learn from
its past mistakes; to discover and confront persisting biases; and
by respectful, rational deliberation to rise above those flaws and
injustices. That process is impeded, not advanced, by court decrees
based on the proposition that the public cannot have the requisite
repose to discuss certain issues. It is demeaning to the democratic
process to presume that the voters are not capable of deciding an
issue of this sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.
. . . .
What is at stake here is not whether injury will be inflicted but
whether government can be instructed not to follow a course that
entails, first, the definition of racial categories and, second, the
grant of favored status to persons in some racial categories and
not others. The electorate’s instruction to governmental entities not
to embark upon the course of race-defined and race-based prefer-
ences was adopted, we must assume, because the voters deemed
a preference system to be unwise, on account of what voters may
deem its latent potential to become itself a source of the very re-
sentments and hostilities based on race that this Nation seeks to
put behind it. Whether those adverse results would follow is, and
should be, the subject of debate. Voters might likewise consider,
after debate and reflection, that programs designed to increase
diversity—consistent with the Constitution—are a necessary part
of progress to transcend the stigma of past racism.116
Amidst the elevated rhetoric in this coda, Kennedy made two empirical claims
on the relationship between voters and Proposal 2.117 First, Kennedy claimed that the
amendment “was adopted, we must assume, because the voters deemed a preference
system to be unwise, on account of what voters may deem its latent potential to become
itself a source of the very resentments and hostilities based on race that this Nation
seeks to put behind it.”118 He added, “Michigan voters acted in concert and statewide
116 Id. at 1636–38.
117 See id. at 1635–38.
118 Id. at 1638.
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to seek consensus.”119 Finally, Kennedy stated that “voters deem[ed] it wise to avoid”
affirmative action “because of its divisive potential.”120 In total, the sentiments that
produced voter support for Proposal 2, Kennedy assumed, were those that opposed
racial divisiveness.121
Second, Kennedy claimed that citizens respond to campaigns like the one for
Proposal 2 by speaking, debating, and learning before acting.122 Public debate would
result in the “ris[ing] above” of racial divisiveness.123 While judicial intervention into
this sensitive area would invite “rancor or discord based on race,” public debate would
“avoid[ ]” it.124
Kennedy’s inclusion of these empirical claims about the relationship between
laws and political attitudes on race may appear tangential to the political restructur-
ing doctrine, but they are consistent with a line of Fourteenth Amendment cases that
“reason[] from antibalkanization values.”125 As we are about to show, this line of cases
demonstrates the importance of the relationship between Proposal 2 and voters’
sentiments on race and highlights the importance of whether Kennedy’s empirical
claims are correct.126
Professor Reva Siegel has written that the dispute about the Fourteenth Amend-
ment “[is often] described as a debate between the anticlassification principle and
the antisubordination principle.”127 In this model, conservatives advocate for the for-
mer principle, intolerant of any racial classification; liberals advocate for the latter
principle, concerned with harm to members of marginalized groups.128 As Siegel
notes, however, swing justices have both upheld and restricted race-conscious action,
justifying their moderation with a concern for the social disharmony that “both extreme
racial stratification and unconstrained racial remedies can engender.”129 Siegel posits
that the swing justices, including Kennedy, “reason from antibalkanization concerns.”130
119 Id. at 1637.
120 Id. at 1636.
121 Id. at 1638.
122 See id.
123 Id. at 1637.
124 Id. at 1635.
125 See Siegel, supra note 15, at 1278, 1300–03.
126 See infra Part II.
127 Siegel, supra note 15, at 1287.
128 See id. at 1287–89.
129 Id. at 1278.
130 Id. at 1350 & n.10. We describe the antibalkanization principle without defending it.
Limiting social divisiveness seems like a worthy enough goal and one somewhat related to
the Equal Protection Clause’s principle of equality, but we agree that “antibalkanization may
be best understood as a pragmatic set of ad hoc compromises between anticlassification and
antisubordination, rather than a theory on which to build antidiscrimination law.” Samuel R.
Bagenstos, Bottlenecks and Antidiscrimination Theory, 93 TEX. L. REV. 415, 417 (2014)
(reviewing JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2014)).
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In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,131 four Justices opposed ad-
missions policies that were conscious of race and four Justices insisted that overcom-
ing minority underrepresentation justified the use of racial quotas.132 Justice Powell,
the decisive fifth vote, upheld affirmative action while limiting it.133 Powell rejected
an asymmetrical view of the Fourteenth Amendment that took discrimination against
whites less seriously, writing, “Disparate constitutional tolerance of such classifica-
tions well may serve to exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms rather than alleviate
them.”134 Powell also expressed concern that ethnic whites, who had suffered their
own history of discrimination, would feel a “perception of mistreatment” towards
a system that allocated benefits on the basis of skin color.135 Yet Powell upheld af-
firmative action under the rationale of “diversity,” finding that if the medical schools
eliminated quotas and replaced them with individualized consideration of all appli-
cants, any rejected student “would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment.”136
The Court would later ratify the diversity framework in Grutter v. Bollinger137 and
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.138 Powell sought a balance that both limited
antagonism between racial groups and ensured that any rejected student would not
be able to impugn the legitimacy of the university.139
Powell was not the only Justice to worry about racial polarization due to race-
conscious government actions.140 Concurring in part with the Court’s upholding of
a redistricting plan under the Voting Rights Act, Brennan wrote that “we cannot well
ignore the social reality that even a benign policy of assignment by race is viewed
as unjust by many in our society, especially by those individuals who are adversely
affected by a given classification.”141
Given the current importance of antibalkanization to the outcome in race equality cases,
however, we find the empirical validity of the Court’s judgments as significant whatever the
principle’s theoretical weaknesses.
131 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
132 See id. at 357 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Brennan’s opinion, joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, states: “Unquestionably we have
held that a government practice . . . which contains ‘suspect classifications’ [such as racial
quotas] is to be subject to ‘strict scrutiny’ and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling
government purpose . . . .” Id.
133 Id. at 272 (majority opinion).
134 Id. at 298–99.
135 Id. at 294 n.34.
136 Id. at 318.
137 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
138 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013) (“We begin with the principal opinion authored by Justice
Powell in Bakke.”).
139 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. at 318.
140 See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 174
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
141 Id.
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In Shaw v. Reno,142 the Court held that an allegation that a piece of redistricting
legislation was so irregular that it could only be an attempt to segregate by race was
a cognizable equal protection claim.143 O’Connor wrote for the majority:
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to
our society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too
much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the
color of their skin. . . . Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial
purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it
threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system
in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation contin-
ues to aspire.144
O’Connor feared not only antagonism between racial groups, but also the potential of
racial classifications to divide blacks and whites into different political coalitions.145
In Bush v. Vera,146 another redistricting case, O’Connor wrote that significant
deviations from traditional districting principles “cause constitutional harm insofar
as they convey the message that political identity is, or should be, predominantly
racial.”147 The bizarre shaping of districts cutting across traditional divisions “dis-
rupts nonracial bases of political identity and thus intensifies the emphasis on race.”148
O’Connor was again expressing worry over political sentiments that arise from and
can be predicted by race.149
O’Connor’s concern over factions may also help to explain her decision to up-
hold affirmative action. In Grutter, she wrote:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes
of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be vis-
ibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must have
142 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
143 Id. at 642.
144 Id. at 657.
145 The use of the term “faction” evoked James Madison’s concern in Federalist No. 10
that diversity in political opinions would cause citizens to split into competing and self-
interested political factions. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 77–78 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
146 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
147 Id. at 980.
148 Id. at 980–81.
149 See id.
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confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational insti-
tutions that provide this training. . . . Access to legal education
(and thus the legal profession) must be inclusive of talented and
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity . . . .150
She later noted that minority students can bring their “unique experience of being
a racial minority” to the classroom, but they do so only because “race unfortunately
still matters.”151 She appeared to be confirming the fear she expressed in Shaw of
blacks and whites split into political factions, while also expressing the worry that
the black community would not view a university system with few black students
as legitimate.152
Kennedy dissented in Grutter due to the majority’s alleged failure to apply rigor-
ous judicial review, but he echoed the majority’s concern of a balkanized America.153
He wrote, “Preferment by race, when resorted to by the State, can be the most divi-
sive of all policies, containing within it the potential to destroy confidence in the
Constitution and in the idea of equality.”154
Kennedy reiterated his concerns in his decisive vote in Parents Involved in Com-
munity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.155 Kennedy struck down the school
districts’ attempts to use racial classifications to promote diversity but insisted that
they may use race-conscious but facially neutral policies in an attempt to integrate.156
He explained the basis for his distinction between direct and indirect means, writing:
Governmental classifications that command people to march in
different directions based on racial typologies can cause a new
divisiveness. The practice can lead to corrosive discourse, where
race serves not as an element of our diverse heritage but instead
as a bargaining chip in the political process. On the other hand
race-conscious measures that do not rely on differential treat-
ment based on individual classifications present these problems
to a lesser degree.157
The language echoed O’Connor’s language of factions.158
150 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003).
151 Id. at 333.
152 See id. at 332–33.
153 Id. at 387–88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 388.
155 551 U.S. 701, 782–84 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
156 Id. at 789.
157 Id. at 797.
158 See supra notes 144–52 and accompanying text.
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Ricci v. DeStefano159 did not address the Equal Protection Clause,160 and even its
statutory holding was, in Siegel’s words, “remarkably unclear,”161 but Kennedy’s opin-
ion gives further content to his idea of antibalkanization.162 White and Hispanic fire-
fighters sued the City of New Haven for violating Title VII after the fire department
threw out the results of a promotional examination due to the poor performances
from black firefighters.163 The Court ruled for the white firefighters, with Kennedy
writing that employers can consider the racial effect of an exam before the adminis-
tration of the test but not after,164 which—like the distinction between facial and
indirect race-conscious measures in Parents Involved—is hard to grasp unless anti-
balkanization is its underlying principle. Discussion of race preadministration can
ensure a test free of discriminating against minorities, “the very racial animosities
Title VII was intended to prevent.”165 By invalidating the test after its administra-
tion, however, the fire department was “upsetting an employee’s legitimate expecta-
tion not to be judged on the basis of race.”166 Although difficult to parse, Kennedy’s
opinion nods to a model of antibalkanization that is concerned with the legitimacy
of institutions for the losers of race-conscious actions.167 Kennedy worries blacks
will not acknowledge the system as legitimate if few are promoted—justifying the
use of race preadministration—but that whites will resent the system if they are
denied promotions “once [the] process has been established,” barring the use of race
postadministration.168
Most recently, the Court again upheld the practice of affirmative action with
Kennedy still concerned about social cohesion.169 In Fisher, the Court found that the
University’s admissions program survived strict scrutiny, although the Court noted
that “[t]he Court’s affirmance of the University’s admissions policy today does not
necessarily mean the University may rely on that same policy without refinement.”170
The University was obligated, the Court reasoned, to reassess constantly the consti-
tutionality of its admissions programs while considering that “[f]ormalistic racial clas-
sifications . . . when used in a divisive manner, could undermine the educational
benefits the University values.”171
159 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
160 See generally id.
161 Siegel, supra note 15, at 1325.
162 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 583.
163 Id. at 562–63.
164 Id. at 583–85.
165 Id. at 584.
166 Id. at 585.
167 See id.
168 See id.
169 Yuvraj Joshi, Bakke to the Future: Affirmative Action After Fisher, 69 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 17, 24 (2016).
170 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II ), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016).
171 Id. at 2210.
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Social cohesion and racial antagonism, the two core antibalkanization values con-
sidered crucial to these Equal Protection cases, seemed to be at play in the campaign
over Proposal 2.172 The Proposal and the accompanying campaign could have under-
mined social cohesion by dividing the races into different political coalitions, widen-
ing the division that existed prior to Proposal 2; and could have activated feelings
of racial hostility (among whites) and racial separation (among African Americans),
turning the vote on Proposal 2 into a referendum on race. And indeed, this is pre-
cisely what the data show.173
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THE BALKANIZING
EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSAL 2 CAMPAIGN
We note, as others have, that “[c]onstitutional law is chock full of questions and
assumptions that beg for empirical analysis,”174 but that “[a]lthough constitutional
law is riddled with empirical judgments, this fact seems to be lost on most constitu-
tional law scholars.”175 Darren Lenard Hutchinson has argued that the Court has not
supported its antibalkanization reasoning with empirical research and that its con-
clusions have no empirical basis.176 We attempt to use empirical methods to evaluate
the Court’s antibalkanization claims in the context of Schuette.
To assess the effect of the Proposal 2 campaign, we designed a pair of coordi-
nated and simultaneous surveys, one carried out in Michigan, the other carried out
in the country as a whole. Both were administered by Polimetrix, Inc., of Palo Alto,
California, and were conducted as part of the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Elec-
tion Study (CCES), a cooperative venture of research teams from thirty-eight major
universities.177 Interviews were conducted online with representative samples of the
Michigan and American electorates, before and after the 2006 midterm elections. Both
studies—one based on a sample of Michigan voters, the other based on a sample of
American voters—include a deliberate oversampling of African Americans. Had we
selected respondents following a simple random sampling procedure, we would have
ended up with too few African Americans to sustain the kinds of analysis we needed
to undertake.178
172 See discussion infra Part II.
173 See discussion infra Part II.
174 Lee Epstein et al., Foreword: Testing the Constitution, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1001, 1009
(2015).
175 Id. at 1006.
176 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Preventing Balkanization or Facilitating Racial Domi-
nation: A Critique of the New Equal Protection, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 7 (2015).
177 The 2006 CCES data, which we used to calculate the following statistics, can be found
at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2438384&version=RELEASED&version
=.0 [https://perma.cc/Y6EC-VNRG].
178 The Principal Investigator for the 2006 CCES was Steve Ansolabehere (MIT); the
Study Director was Lynn Vavreck (UCLA); and the Design Committee was made up of
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The evidence is consistent with the conclusion that Proposal 2 widened the po-
litical divide between blacks and whites. As we will show, whites voted decisively
in favor of Proposal 2, while blacks voted overwhelmingly against it. The racial dif-
ference over Proposal 2 in Michigan in 2006 is exceptional: greater than differences
associated with other social cleavages, greater than the racial difference over a hypo-
thetical ballot initiative worded identically to Proposal 2 posed to our national sample
in 2006, greater than we would have expected given the social and economic charac-
teristics of Michigan, greater than racial differences over affirmative action reported
in contemporaneous surveys, and greater than racial differences reported by national
surveys over the most contentious racial issues of the last fifty years.179
Ansolabehere, Vavreck, Robert Erickson (Columbia), Elizabeth Gerber (Michigan), Donald
Kinder (Michigan), Jeremy Pope (Brigham Young), Wendy Rahn (Minnesota), Douglas
Rivers (Polimetrix and Stanford), and John Sides (George Washington). Respondents were
selected by sample matching. Lynn Vavreck & Douglas Rivers, The 2006 Cooperative
Congressional Election Study, 18 J. ELECTIONS, PUB. OPINION & PARTIES 355, 357 (2008)
(U.K.). See generally Douglas Rivers, Sampling for Web Surveys (Aug. 1, 2007) (paper pre-
pared for 2007 Joint Statistical Meetings, Salt Lake City, Utah). Sample weights are applied
throughout the analysis. On the relative advantages and disadvantages of internet-based
surveys, see generally Stephen Ansolabehere & Douglas Rivers, Cooperative Survey Research,
16 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 307 (2013); Stephen Ansolabehere & Brian F. Schaffner, Does
Survey Mode Still Matter? Findings from a 2010 Multi-Mode Comparison, 22 POL. ANALYSIS
285 (2014); Linchiat Chang & Jon A. Krosnick, National Surveys Via RDD Telephone In-
terviewing Versus the Internet: Comparing Sample Representativeness and Response
Quality, 73 PUB. OPINION. Q. 641 (2009); Neil Malhotra & Jon A. Krosnick, The Effect of
Survey Mode and Sampling on Inferences About Political Attitudes and Behavior: Com-
paring the 2000 and 2004 ANES to Internet Surveys with Nonprobability Samples, 15 POL.
ANALYSIS 286 (2007); Seth J. Hill et al., The Opt-In Internet Panel: Survey Mode, Sampling
Methodology and the Implications for Political Research (Apr. 12, 2007) (paper presented
at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Association, Chicago, Illinois); and Douglas
Rivers & Delia Bailey, Inference from Matched Samples in the 2008 U.S. National Elections
(Aug. 3, 2009) (paper presented at 2009 Joint Statistical Meetings, Washington, D.C.). The
2006 CCES data are high quality, furnishing the empirical foundation for articles published
in top journals, in political science and in law. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel
Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge
to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1742–43 (2008); Alan S.
Gerber & Gregory A. Huber, Partisanship, Political Control, and Economic Assessments,
54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 153, 156 (2010); Michael A. Neblo et al., Who Wants to Deliberate—And
Why?, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 566, 571 (2010).
179 Here is the exact question:
This November’s ballot contained a proposition called the Michigan
Civil Rights Initiative. This initiative would make it illegal for state and
local governments to give preferential treatment to any individual or group
on the grounds of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin. This would
affect hiring and promotion, college admissions, and the selection of
government contractors. Did you vote on this ballot measure—the
Michigan Civil Rights Initiative? Yes/No
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Whites voted decisively in favor of Proposal 2; blacks voted overwhelmingly
against it. According to our Michigan survey, of those who said they had participated
in the election, 65.2% of whites but only 13.8% of blacks reported that they had voted
for Proposal 2. Proposal 2 generated a racial difference of 51.4 percentage points.
Of course, race was not the only social category associated with the vote. Accord-
ing to the Michigan survey, Proposal 2 was more popular among men than among
women, more popular among Catholics than among Protestants, and more popular
among those with relatively little formal education than among those with relatively
extensive formal education.180 But these differences pale in comparison to the racial
difference. No other social category comes close to race in dividing the Michigan elec-
torate over Proposal 2 so decisively.
Respondents to the Michigan survey were asked whether they had voted for or
against the MCRI; respondents to our national survey were asked whether they would
have supported or opposed a hypothetical ballot initiative presented so as to parallel
the MCRI.181 This hypothetical version of Proposal 2 posed to the national sample
also produced a large racial divide. Among those who said they would have voted on
the ballot proposal, 83.2% of whites said they would have supported it, as against
40.6% of blacks, a racial difference of 42.6 percentage points. This is a large differ-
ence, though not as large as the racial divide generated by Proposal 2 in Michigan.
This suggests that the campaign surrounding Proposal 2 polarized the Michigan
electorate along racial lines.182
If YES: How did you vote on the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative?
Favor/Oppose
180 56.4% of men voted for Proposal 2 compared to 40.4% of women (a difference of 16.0
percentage points); 64.0% of Catholics voted for Proposal 2 compared to 55.2% of Protestants
(a 8.8 percentage point difference); and 62.1% of those whose formal education ended with
a high school diploma or less voted for Proposal 2 compared to 39.2% of those whose formal
education included postgraduate work (a difference of 22.9 percentage points).
181 Here is the question posed to the national sample:
Some states have recently proposed ballot initiatives that would make
it illegal for state and local governments to give preferential treatment
to any individual or group on the grounds of race, sex, color, ethnicity,
or national origin. This would affect hiring and promotion, college ad-
missions, and the selection of government contractors. If such a propo-
sition had appeared on the election ballot in your state this November,
how do you think you would have voted?
Favor/Oppose/Not Sure/Wouldn’t Have Voted
182 The difference between the racial divide over Proposal 2 in Michigan (51.4 percentage
points) and the racial divide over the hypothetical version of Proposal 2 posed to our national
sample (42.6 percentage points) is statistically significant (p < .01).
Notice that the real proposal to end affirmative action (MCRI in Michigan) was less
popular than the hypothetical proposal posed to the country as a whole, among blacks and
whites alike, though especially among blacks. This would seem to be another consequence
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Michigan is not the nation. It could be that racial differences in opinion over
matters of race in Michigan are generally greater than in the country as a whole;
perhaps the campaign surrounding Proposal 2 had nothing to with it.
To investigate this possibility, we made use of the Common Content component
of the 2006 CCES, administered to nearly 36,000 Americans. The sample was drawn
to be representative of state populations, and the Common Content component in-
cluded a question on affirmative action.183 This design allows us to analyze opinions
on affirmative action across states as a consequence of state social and economic
characteristics.
Our regression analysis estimates the effect of Race (percentage African American),
Education, Unemployment (percentage unemployed), Income (median family annual
income in 2006 inflation-adjusted dollars), Poverty (percentage of families with in-
come below poverty level), Region, and Unionization (percentage of employed who
are members of a union).184 We set aside states, like Alaska and Wyoming, with tiny
black populations.185 We also set aside Michigan. Our purpose here is to predict what
the racial divide over affirmative action in Michigan would be, in light of economic
and social characteristics, and in the absence of the Proposal 2 campaign.
The results, summarized in Table 1, show that economic and social characteris-
tics of states are systematically related to public opinion on affirmative action. Whites
living in states where education is relatively high and unionization is relatively strong
tend to be more liberal on affirmative action; whites living in states that are relatively
affluent and contain a relatively large percentage of blacks tend to be more conser-
vative on affirmative action. At the same time, blacks living in states characterized
by relatively high levels of education and relatively high levels of unemployment tend
to lean liberal on affirmative action.
of the campaign, which entailed, in part, a concerted effort to articulate the real consequences
of Proposal 2 should it pass.
183 The question reads:
Some people think that if a company has a history of discriminating
against blacks when making hiring decisions, then they should be required
to have an affirmative action program that gives blacks preferences in
hiring. What do you think? Should companies that have discriminated
against blacks have to have an affirmative action program?
Support Strongly/Support/Support Slightly/Mixed/Oppose Slightly/
Oppose/Oppose Strongly
184 The information on states is taken from the Labor Force Statistics from the Current
Population Survey, BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/CPS/#data [https://perma.cc
/U55G-PMKB], and the American Community Survey conducted by the Census Bureau
(https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/guidance/comparing-acs-data/2006.html
[https://perma.cc/9TG6-A5KL]), all as of 2006.
185 Using the CPS table creator, https://www.census.gov/cps/data/cpstablecreator.html
[https://perma.cc/GJA2-E2DU], blacks only accounted for 3.2% of Alaska’s total population
and only 0.78% of Wyoming’s total population in 2006.
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Table 1
Social and Economic Characteristics of States as Predictors of the Magnitude
of the Racial Divide Over Affirmative Action186
Least Squares Regression Coefficients






   Income 0.004** 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
   Unionization -0.235 0.001
(0.157) (0.310)
   Education -0.844** -10.055
(0.329) (0.652)
   Deep South 0.002 -0.056
(0.036) (0.071)
   Rim South 0.001 -0.017
(0.025) (0.049)
   Border 0.012 -0.060
(0.020) (0.039)
   Northeast -0.016 -0.015
(0.017) (0.034)
   West 0.014 0.047
(0.018) (0.035)
   Unemployment -0.352 -2.900
(0.954) (1.890)
   Poverty Rate 0.612 -0.030
(0.506) (1.003)
   Percentage Black 0.210* 0.022
(0.111) (0.220)
      Constant 0.732*** 0.802**
(0.143) (0.284)
      Observations 31 31
      R-squared 0.831 0.505
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
186 Note that each column represents a separate regression equation.
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Based on the results shown in Table 1, we can predict the magnitude of the racial
divide over affirmative action in Michigan, and more precisely, we can predict the
magnitude of the racial divide over affirmative action in a state with the identical eco-
nomic and social characteristics of Michigan. That predicted value is 47.7 percent-
age points (with a standard error of 6.1). This figure is a bit higher than the national
average. Across the states (excluding Michigan and states with tiny black populations),
the observed average racial divide over affirmative action is 43.7 percentage points.
And so, by virtue of its social and economic characteristics, we should expect to see a
somewhat larger racial divide over affirmative action in Michigan than countrywide.
We excluded Michigan from this exercise in prediction, but the 2006 CCES
Common Content of course included interviews in Michigan and asked the same
affirmative action question we have been analyzing. This means we can simply and
directly measure the racial difference in Michigan. On the Common Content affir-
mative action question, the observed racial difference in Michigan is 55.3 percent-
age points, well above the national average and, more to the point, well above the
predicted value for Michigan based on social and economic characteristics. These
results lend additional support to the conclusion that the campaign surrounding
Proposal 2 polarized the Michigan electorate along racial lines.
There is nothing surprising in our finding that blacks and whites differ over Pro-
posal 2. What is notable and instructive is the magnitude of the difference. In par-
ticular, the racial divide over Proposal 2 exceeds what we see in results from national
surveys on affirmative action taken at about the same time. This is shown in Table 2,
which summarizes findings on public opinion on affirmative action from the American
National Election Study (ANES) and the General Social Survey (GSS).187
Table 2





Government should make special efforts to help blacks (ANES)
   2004 35.4 61.0
   2008 30.8 61.2
187 As noted, these data come either from the American National Election Studies (ANES),
carried out by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan (data available
at http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/download/datacenter_all_NoData.php [https://
perma.cc/WDT4-FDGR]), or by the General Social Survey (GSS), carried out by the
National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago (data available at http://gss
.norc.org/ [https://perma.cc/X3WU-6AE6]). The ANES and the GSS are widely regarded to
be the nation’s best surveys in the domain of public opinion. Christopher D. Bader & Roger
Finke, Evaluating Survey Measures Using the ARDA’s Measurement Wizard, in FAITHFUL
MEASURES: NEW METHODS IN THE MEASUREMENT OF RELIGION 140, 153 (Roger Finke &
Christopher D. Bader eds., 2017).





Racial preferences in hiring and promotion (GSS)
   2002 17.5 49.8
   2004 18.7 51.2
   2006 17.1 46.4
   2008 19.1 50.8
   2010 19.3 49.3
Affirmative action in employment (ANES)
   2004 15.9 56.7
   2008 14.2 56.3
Government has a special obligation to improve blacks’ 
standard of living (GSS)
   2002 30.8 61.5
   2004 29.5 61.9
   2006 31.6 63.7
   2008 31.0 63.8
   2010 30.7 56.7
Table 2 reveals large racial differences in every instance—large, but not as large
as what we see in the case of Proposal 2.188 The racial differences displayed in Table
2 average 32 percentage points, ranging from a low of 26 percentage points over
whether the federal government has a special obligation to improve the standard of
living of black Americans (in 2010), to a high of 42 percentage points over the de-
sirability of affirmative action in hiring and promotion (in 2008). Racial differences
over affirmative action are substantial in Table 2, but not as substantial as the racial
differences generated by Proposal 2 in Michigan.
The racial divide over Proposal 2 exceeds that of even the most contentious racial
issues of the last 60 years. Consider these examples, all taken from the benchmark
ANES189:
• School Integration. In 1956, shortly after the historic Brown v. Board
of Education190 decision, 46% of whites and 66% of blacks supported
the idea that the government in Washington should step in to ensure that
188 See infra Tables 3 & 4. The benchmark ANES contains only raw data, which we then
extrapolated into the statistics contained in the following notes.
189 See supra note 187.
190 See generally 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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black and white children could attend school together (a racial differ-
ence of 20 percentage points).
• Public Accommodations. In the fall of 1964, near the height of America’s
20th century racial crisis, and just following Congressional passage of
the Civil Rights Act,191 49% of whites and 92% of blacks endorsed the
policy of the federal government insuring black people the freedom to
enter hotels and restaurants (a racial difference of 43 percentage points).
• Urban Riots. In the aftermath of the riots in Watts192 and Detroit193 and
hundreds of other American cities, large and small, 52% of whites and
80% of blacks said that the way to handle riots was to work on the under-
lying problems of poverty and unemployment that gave rise to the vio-
lence in the first place (a racial difference of 28 percentage points).
• School Busing. Busing to integrate the public schools was a major bone
of contention in the 1972 Nixon-McGovern presidential campaign.194
At the conclusion of the campaign, 13% of whites and 43% of blacks
supported busing children to achieve school desegregation (a racial gap
of 30 percentage points).
In each example, the racial differences, though large, are not nearly as large as
the racial difference generated by Proposal 2.195
In sum, Proposal 2 divided the Michigan electorate along racial lines to an excep-
tional degree: more than school desegregation, the Civil Rights Act, the urban riots
of the 1960s, or school busing; more than what we generally observe in opinion on
affirmative action; more than would be expected from Michigan’s social and eco-
nomic characteristics; and more than a hypothetical version of Proposal 2 divided
the national electorate.
191 See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-353, 78 Stat. 241.
192 See generally, e.g., Elaine Woo, Rena Price Dies at 97; Her and Son’s Arrests Sparked
Watts Riots, L.A. TIMES ( June 23, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/22/local/la-me
-rena-price-20130623 [https://perma.cc/6K6N-HJZR].
193 See generally SIDNEY FINE, VIOLENCE IN THE MODEL CITY: THE CAVANAGH AD-
MINISTRATION, RACE RELATIONS, AND THE DETROIT RIOT OF 1967 (2007 ed. 1989).
194 DAVID A. HOROWITZ, AMERICA’S POLITICAL CLASS UNDER FIRE: THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY’S GREATEST CULTURE WAR 194 (2003).
195 As far as we have been able to determine, the racial divide over Proposal 2 is equaled
in modern times in only two instances: racial differences in the vote generated by the 2008
and 2012 Obama presidential elections. See DONALD R. KINDER & ALLISON DALE-RIDDLE,
THE END OF RACE? OBAMA, 2008, AND RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 87–88, 88 n.30 (2012);
Donald Kinder, Professor, Univ. of Mich., Race Receding? Comparing the 2008 and 2012
U.S. Presidential Elections (2017).
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Next, we go deeper into the relationship between the motivations of voters and
the nature of the Proposal 2 campaign. We present evidence consistent with the con-
clusion that the campaign on affirmative action in Michigan in 2006 exacerbated the
degree to which Michigan voters—white and black—relied on considerations of race
in deciding how to vote on Proposal 2. Among white voters, feelings of racial resent-
ment were strongly associated with the vote: racially resentful whites voted decisively
for Proposal 2 while racially sympathetic whites (fewer in number) voted decisively
against Proposal 2. Furthermore, the relationship between racial feelings and the white
vote on Proposal 2 was significantly stronger than the relationship between racial
feelings and the white vote on a hypothetical ballot initiative worded identically to
Proposal 2 posed to our national sample. Among black voters, feelings of racial group
solidarity were significantly associated with the vote: racially identified blacks voted
overwhelmingly against Proposal 2 while blacks less closely identified with their racial
group voted less overwhelmingly against Proposal 2. Furthermore, the relationship
between feelings of racial solidarity and the black vote on Proposal 2 was stronger
than the relationship between racial solidarity and the black vote on a hypothetical
ballot initiative worded identically to Proposal 2 posed to our national sample.
Why might we expect the Proposal 2 campaign to exacerbate racial differences?
In a series of ingenious and influential experiments, Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky established (among other things) that the judgments people reach and the
decisions they make are subject to systematic and pervasive framing effects.196
Kahneman and Tversky are making an altogether general claim about framing, but
one that may apply with special force to politics.197 Presidents, members of Congress,
interest groups, corporate publicists, activists, reporters and editors: all are perpetu-
ally engaged in efforts to “frame” current events.198 Frames influence voters’ judg-
ments and decisions by altering the relative salience of different aspects of the issue.199
196 See Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1449, 1458–60 (2003). See generally Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE
453 (1981). The Kahneman and Tversky experiments gave rise to an industry of research;
spawned an entire new field (“behavioral economics”); and in time, delivered to Kahneman
the Nobel Prize in Economic Science. (Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize in 2002 for
the work he did with Tversky, who died in 1996. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, The
Two Friends Who Changed How We Think About How We Think, NEW YORKER (Dec. 7,
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/the-two-friends-who-changed-how
-we-think-about-how-we-think). For summaries and reviews of this work, see generally
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et
al. eds., 2002); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman
et al. eds., 1982). For applications of the principle of framing to political communication and
public opinion, see generally Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 103 (2007).
197 See generally, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 196.
198 See Chong & Druckman, supra note 196, at 107, 109, 112, 117.
199 Dietram A. Scheufele & David Tewksbury, Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming:
The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models, 57 J. COMM. 9, 15 (2007).
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Frames highlight some features and ignore others.200 Highlighted features are psycho-
logically accessible and thereby disproportionately influential.201 Which frames pre-
vail can affect how citizens understand an issue, and, in the end, what their judgments
and decisions turn out to be.202
The campaign surrounding Proposal 2 was framed in a way that highlighted race.
Proponents of Proposal 2 portrayed the measure as seeking to eliminate “racial prefer-
ence.”203 They characterized affirmative action as an unfair and obsolete, a “racial
spoils system.”204 One supporter argued that “Michiganders . . . despise preference by
race,” and cautioned that those opposed to Proposal 2 “wish to retain racial prefer-
ences . . . [o]r they hope to introduce new preferences for some ethnic groups.”205
The campaign against Proposal 2 also highlighted race.206 Opponents warned that
strides made by racial minorities and by women would be lost if the initiative passed.
One editorial argued that enacting Proposal 2 “would send the wrong message about
Michigan as a place of opportunity,” that Proposal 2 would “end[ ] opportunities for
minorities and women,” and that “[a]ffirmative action is about equalizing opportunities”
and “helping to create opportunities for segments of the population that have histori-
cally been denied them.”207 Opponents also warned of the balkanization created by
the Proposal 2 campaign.208 In an interview, Linda Parker, director of the Michigan
Department of Civil Rights, called the initiative “divisive,” one that exacerbated
200 Id. at 11–12.
201 Id.
202 See generally, e.g., DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR:
RACIAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS (1996); Thomas E. Nelson & Donald R. Kinder,
Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in American Public Opinion, 58 J. POL. 1055 (1996);
Ismail K. White, When Race Matters and When It Doesn’t: Racial Group Differences in
Response to Racial Cues, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 339 (2007).
203 Chastity Pratt & Dawson Bell, Rights Groups File Prop 2 Lawsuit, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Dec. 20, 2006, at 1.
204 See, e.g., Thomas Bray, Beware Using ‘Racist’ Label in Racial Preferences Battle,
DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 17, 2005, at 13A; George F. Will, Editorial, A Fight to Define
Equality, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2006, at B07.
205 Carl Cohen, Aim for True Equality by Ending Preferences, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July
17, 2005; see also David Littmann, Editorial, Vote Yes: Affirmative Action Is Bad for State’s
Business Climate, True Equality, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 2, 2006, at 6 (arguing “special
preferences” and “special privileges to a chosen few at the expense of many” hamper the
economy, and that “[t]hrough MCRI, individual effort and excellence are rewarded,” which
will make markets thrive).
206 See generally Editorial, No Steps Back on Opportunity; MCRI State Proposal 06-2,
Would Push Back Progress on Hiring and Access to College for Minorities, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Oct. 8, 2006, at 1.
207 Id.
208 See, e.g., Editorial, Face It: Realities Demand Better Balance, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Mar. 23, 2004, at 7A (stating that there are laws on the books, but Michigan is “not where
[it] need[s] to be”).
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Michiganders’ “continued failure to live together” as evident by Michigan’s place
as “No. 2 in the country in terms of residential segregation,” and one “capitalizing
on . . . fears” based on “negative assumptions about [race].”209
In short, race was a prominent feature in the framing of the Proposal 2 campaign.210
We expect as a consequence racial considerations to weigh more heavily in voters’
decisions—but there is no guarantee that this is so. It is an empirical question. To
answer the question, we must determine the relationship between the vote on Pro-
posal 2 and racial prejudice (among whites), and the relationship between the vote
and racial solidarity (among blacks). We take each up in turn.
Among others, George Fredrickson contends that a distinctive form of prejudice
has recently arisen in the United States, one that emphasizes cultural as against
biological differences.211 The crucial point here is that prejudice does not require “an
ideology centered on the concept of biological inequality.”212 Discrimination, neglect,
and exclusion can be justified just as well by what are understood to be “deep-seated
cultural differences.”213
The emergence of a new, cultural form of prejudice is a reflection, in part, of
dramatic transformations in American society: the passing of slavery and end of the
plantation economy;214 the great migration of African Americans out of the rural South
into national urban centers;215 and perhaps especially, the success of the modern civil
rights movement in securing basic rights of citizenship and dismantling many of the
legal foundations underpinning discrimination.216 Many white Americans believed
that discrimination had been eradicated and that if blacks would only try harder they
could be just as well off as whites.217 Instead of complaining about their problems and
demanding special treatment, the new cultural form of prejudice suggested blacks
should buckle down, work hard, and take advantage of the abundant opportunities
now provided to them.218
209 Id.
210 See supra notes 203–09 and accompanying text.
211 GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 4 (2002).
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 See KINDER & DALE-RIDDLE, supra note 195, at 15.
215 See PATRICIA GURIN, SHIRLEY HATCHETT & JAMES S. JACKSON, HOPE AND INDE-
PENDENCE: BLACKS’ RESPONSE TO ELECTORAL AND PARTY POLITICS 24–25 (1989).
216 See Christopher Tarman & David O. Sears, The Conceptualization and Measurement
of Symbolic Racism, 67 J. POL. 731, 731 (2005).
217 Id. at 733 (discussing a consistent view that “blacks are no longer discriminated against,
so remaining disadvantages must result mostly from their own lack of effort”).
218 See KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 202, at 6; Lawrence D. Bobo & Ryan A. Smith,
From Jim Crow Racism to Laissez-Faire Racism: The Transformation of Racial Attitudes, in
BEYOND PLURALISM: THE CONCEPTION OF GROUPS AND GROUP IDENTITIES IN AMERICA 182,
212–13 (Wendy F. Katkin et al. eds., 1998); David O. Sears & P. J. Henry, Over Thirty Years
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A standard battery of questions developed to capture modern prejudice—what we
will call racial resentment—was included in the pre-election interview of our Michi-
gan survey (asked only of whites). The questions, written out in Table 3, emphasize
several central themes: the unwillingness of blacks to work hard and apply them-
selves, the denial that discrimination still stands in the way, and the injustice of spe-
cial treatment. Taken together, the questions distinguish between those whites who
are generally sympathetic towards blacks from those who are generally unsympa-
thetic, resenting the failure of blacks, as they see it, to demonstrate the virtues of self-
reliance and hard work.
Table 3
Racial Resentment Among Michigan Whites
Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their
way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
Strongly agree 30.5%
Agree 34.5
Neither agree nor disagree 14.8
Disagree 13.0
Strongly disagree   7.3
Even today, government officials usually pay more attention to a complaint from a
white person than from a black person.
Strongly agree   6.7%
Agree 23.4
Neither agree nor disagree 21.1
Disagree 27.2
Strongly disagree 21.7
If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.
Strongly agree 13.4%
Agree 23.5
Neither agree nor disagree 26.7
Disagree 23.0
Strongly disagree 13.5
Later: A Contemporary Look at Symbolic Racism, 37 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 95, 100 (2005).
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When it comes to good jobs and decent salaries, most blacks still end up with less
than they deserve.
Strongly agree   6.5%
Agree 29.0
Neither agree nor disagree 28.9
Disagree 23.0
Strongly disagree 12.6
In America today, blacks still face plenty of discrimination because of their race.
Strongly agree 14.8%
Agree 40.3
Neither agree nor disagree 14.6
Disagree 18.7
Strongly disagree 11.6
It’s true that blacks face real problems, but the way to solve these problems is to
stop complaining and to get to work.
Strongly agree 21.9%
Agree 30.7
Neither agree nor disagree 20.7
Disagree 14.9
Strongly disagree 11.9
A first question for our empirical analysis is whether white voters responded to the
various propositions set out in Table 3 consistently, as they should, if the propositions
are getting at the same thing (here, the distinction between racial sympathy and racial
resentment). They do.219 Those whites who agreed that if blacks would only try harder
they would be as well off as whites were also inclined to deny that slavery and dis-
crimination created conditions that impede black progress, that blacks should work
their way up without any special favors, and so on throughout the rest.220 As intended,
responses to the propositions reflect a coherent outlook on the character and culture
of African Americans. A scale (made up simply by averaging responses across the six
questions) does an excellent job discriminating between those whites who are racially
resentful, those who are racially sympathetic, and all gradations in between.221
219 See supra Table 3.
220 See supra Table 3.
221 Consistency is tested by Cronbach’s alpha, a measure of the reliability of the scale
composed of answers to the six questions. In this case, alpha = .868, a very respectable
figure. For comparable empirical tests, with comparable results, see generally Sears & Henry,
supra note 218, and Tarman & Sears, supra note 216.
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To determine the effect of racial resentment on the white vote on Proposal 2, our
analysis must take into account not just racial resentment, but also other relevant fac-
tors as well. We are interested in the independent effect of racial resentment, holding
other factors constant. For this reason, our analysis includes measures of three factors
in addition to racial resentment: party identification; belief in limited government; and
belief in equal opportunity. All three have been shown to be important in explaining
white opinion on issues like affirmative action, and all three are well-measured in the
pre-election interview in our Michigan survey.222 Effects are estimated by multivariate
probit regression and are presented in Table 4 (left-hand column).223
Table 4
The Effect of Racial Resentment on the White Vote Against Affirmative Action—
in Michigan and in the Nation
Probit Coefficients
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Michigan Nation
Racial Resentment 2.785*** 2.107***
(0.427) (0.448)
Party Identification 0.597* 0.061
(0.308) (0.261)
Limited Government 0.556** 0.048
(0.231) (0.226)





*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
222 On partisanship, see ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER: AN ABRIDGE-
MENT 7 (1964) (discussing the political impact of identification with social class), and Larry
M. Bartels, Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952–1996, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 35, 41 (2000)
(analyzing the polarization of political parties along racial lines); on limited government, see
Gregory B. Markus, American Individualism Reconsidered, in CITIZENS AND POLITICS: PER-
SPECTIVES FROM POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 401, 415, 416 (James H. Kuklinksi ed., 2001) (high-
lighting minority groups’ voting tendencies); and on equal opportunity, see Stanley Feldman,
Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and Values, 32 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 416, 418–19 (1988) (explaining political attitudes and beliefs among social classes).
223 The analysis uses multivariate regression because voting on Proposal 2 is a product of
more than one factor, and probit regression because voting on Proposal 2 is a binary variable
(scored 1 if the person votes for Proposal 2 and scored 0 if the person votes against Proposal 2).
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Table 4 shows a statistically significant and substantively sizable effect of racial
resentment on support for Proposal 2. Racially resentful whites were much more likely
to vote for Proposal 2 than were racially sympathetic whites.224
Table 4 also reveals that Republicans were somewhat more likely to vote for Pro-
posal 2 than were Democrats, and that those voters concerned about the scope and
size of the federal government were somewhat more likely to vote for Proposal 2 than
were those who said they believed in the necessity of a strong central government.
These two effects are real, but neither approaches the magnitude of the effect due
to racial resentment.225 By far, the most important factor influencing the white vote
in Michigan in 2006 is racial resentment.226
The magnitude of this effect can be seen in Figure 1, which graphs the predicted
white vote for Proposal 2 as a consequence of variation in racial resentment, holding
constant the effects due to partisanship, limited government, and equal opportunity.227
Figure 1
Racial Resentment and White Support for Michigan’s Proposal 2
Figure 1 reveals how quickly support for Proposal 2 gathered strength with in-
creasing racial sentiment scores. Racially sympathetic whites (a score of .25 on the
224 See supra Table 4.
225 See supra Table 4; infra Figure 1
226 See infra Figure 1.
227 The predictions displayed in Figure 1 assume a white voter who is a political Inde-
pendent, with average views on limited government and equal opportunity.
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0–1.0 racial resentment scale) voted decisively against Proposal 2 (by a margin of
63–37), while racially resentful whites (a score of .75 on the 0–1.0 racial resentment
scale) voted even more decisively for Proposal 2 (83–17).228 Among white voters in
Michigan, Proposal 2 reduced essentially to a referendum on their sentiments toward
African Americans.
A final test for the white vote addresses whether feelings of racial resentment
played a larger role as a consequence of the campaign, given the explicitly racial fram-
ing of Proposal 2. To find out, we repeated the analysis we have just been discuss-
ing, this time running the analysis on our national sample. We designed the national
study for this explicit purpose, and so we included the identical measures of racial
resentment, partisanship, limited government, and equal opportunity that were part of
the Michigan study. And as indicated earlier, we asked the national sample a ques-
tion about a hypothetical ballot initiative in their state that mimicked Proposal 2 in
Michigan.229 The results of the national analysis are presented in Table 4 (right-hand
column), alongside the corresponding results from Michigan.
The results show first of all, that the effect of racial resentment on white support
for eliminating affirmative action is positive and statistically significant in the national
sample, as it was in Michigan.230 More to the point, Table 4 also shows that the effect
of racial resentment on opposition to affirmative action was greater among Michigan
voters than among voters in the country. The difference between the two—between
the effect of racial resentment in Michigan and the effect of racial resentment in the
country—is statistically significant.231
We turn now to the black vote. In explaining opinion and voting among African
Americans, scholarship emphasizes one factor above all others: racial group solidar-
ity.232 Some blacks see their personal prospects linked with the fate of their racial
group, while others do not, and this difference turns out to be important in explaining
their opinions on racial policies and the intensity of their support for black candidates.233
228 See supra Figure 1.
229 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
230 See supra Table 4.
231 p < .05, one-tailed test. The result holds under alternative specifications: adding employ-
ment status and union membership to the analysis, or comparing the results for Michigan
voters only to voters living in States that resemble Michigan (Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Penn-
sylvania, New Jersey, and New York). The Proposal 2 campaign seemed to have multiple
effects in addition to exacerbating the effect of racial resentment; enhancing the effect due to
partisanship and limited government (both get connected up to the vote in Michigan, but not
elsewhere); and overriding the effect due to equality of opportunity. This last result is especially
interesting on the idea that equal opportunity is widely regarded as the most important of
American values pushing white Americans towards a more color-blind society. See KINDER
& SANDERS, supra note 202, at 6–7.
232 See MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN
POLITICS 7–8 (1994).
233 See id. at 8 (stating that race interests often outweigh class interest “because the social,
economic, and political realities of whites and blacks differ substantially because of race”);
see also GURIN, HATCHETT & JACKSON, supra note 215, at 223; KINDER & DALE-RIDDLE,
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With this well-established result in mind, we included a standard battery of ques-
tions to measure racial group solidarity in our Michigan survey. Blacks were asked
how often they felt pride over the accomplishments of blacks, how often they felt
anger about the way blacks were treated, and how closely they saw their own fate
bound up with the fate of blacks in general. The exact questions are presented in
Table 5, along with the distribution of responses each question elicited. We created
a racial group solidarity scale by averaging responses across the three questions.234
Table 5
Racial Group Solidarity Among Michigan Blacks




Once in a while 23.6
Hardly ever  0.5




Once in a while 21.0
Hardly ever  2.1
How much do you think that what happens to other black people in this country will
have something to do with what happens in your life?
A lot 55.7
Some 33.2
Not very much  9.3
None at all  1.7
supra note 195, at 20; KATHERINE TATE, FROM PROTEST TO POLITICS: THE NEW BLACK
VOTERS IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 21 (1993) (“Blacks are united politically by race . . . .”).
234 Cronbach’s alpha for the three-item racial solidarity scale is .450. This modest reli-
ability means we are probably underestimating the real effect of racial group solidarity on
the Proposal 2 vote.
728 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:693
To what extent is racial group solidarity associated with the black vote on
Proposal 2? As in our analysis of racial resentment and the white vote, to obtain an
unbiased estimate of the effect of racial group solidarity on the black vote on Pro-
posal 2, our analysis must take into account other relevant factors. As before, we
consider three: party identification; belief in limited government; and belief in equal
opportunity. And as before, effects are estimated by multivariate probit regression.
Results are presented in Table 6 (in the left-hand column).
Table 6
The Effect of Racial Group Solidarity on the Black Vote on Affirmative Action—
in Michigan and in the Nation235
Michigan Nation
Racial Solidarity -1.134* -0.980**
(0.678) (0.410)
Party Identification -0.669 0.495
(0.786) (0.338)
Limited Government 1.378*** 0.543**
(0.331) (0.268)





*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
Standard Errors in Parentheses
The results indicate a statistically significant and substantively sizable effect of
racial group solidarity on opposition to Proposal 2.236 Racially conscious blacks were
more likely to vote against Proposal 2 than were blacks who did not identify with their
racial group, controlling on partisanship, limited government, and equal opportunity.237
The magnitude of the effect due to racial solidarity can be seen in Figure 2, which
translates the coefficient results presented in Table 6 into graphical form. Figure 2
shows the predicted vote for Proposal 2 as a consequence of variation in racial group
solidarity, holding constant the effects due to partisanship, limited government, and
equal opportunity.238
235 Note that each column represents a separate probit score.
236 See supra Table 6.
237 See supra Table 6.
238 The predictions displayed in Figure 2 assume a black voter who is a political Inde-
pendent, with average views on limited government and equal opportunity.
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Figure 2
Racial Group Solidarity and Black Support for Michigan’s Proposal 2
Figure 2 provides a reminder of how overwhelmingly black voters opposed
Proposal 2. Even so, racial solidarity makes a difference. Opposition to Proposal 2
strengthens as racial group solidarity intensifies.239
Our next and final question is whether the effect due to racial group solidarity
on black opposition to affirmative action is greater in Michigan than in the country
as a whole, a consequence, presumably, of the racial framing of the ballot initiative.
We ran the same analysis on our national study, which included the identical ques-
tions on racial group solidarity that were part of the Michigan study. The results of
the national analysis are presented in Table 6 (right-hand column), side by side with
the Michigan results.240
Table 6 shows that the effect of racial group solidarity on black opposition to
eliminating affirmative action is positive and statistically significant in the national
sample, just as it was in the Michigan sample. Table 6 also shows that the effect of ra-
cial group solidarity on opposition to affirmative action was greater among Michigan
voters than among voters in the country. However, the difference between the two—
between the effect of racial solidarity in Michigan and the effect of racial solidarity
in the country—is modest and not statistically significant.241 We cannot be sure that
239 See supra Figure 2.
240 See supra Table 6.
241 See supra Table 6.
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racial group solidarity played a larger role in motivating black opposition to the elim-
ination of affirmative action in 2006 in Michigan than in the country as a whole.
Taken as a whole, the evidence presented here strongly suggests that Proposal 2
betrayed the antibalkanization values of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, Proposal 2
undermined social cohesion by dividing the races into different political coalitions,
widening the division arising from the background politics of affirmative action. Sec-
ond, Proposal 2 activated feelings of racial hostility among whites and perhaps did the
same for feelings of racial separation among blacks, turning the vote on Proposal 2
into a referendum on race.
Whites voted decisively in favor of Proposal 2, while blacks voted overwhelm-
ingly against it. The racial difference over Proposal 2 in Michigan in 2006 was greater
than differences associated with other social cleavages; greater than the racial differ-
ence over a hypothetical ballot initiative worded identically to Proposal 2 posed to a
national sample in 2006; greater than racial differences over affirmative action reported
in contemporaneous national surveys; and greater than racial differences reported by
national surveys over the most contentious racial issues of the last fifty years.
Among whites, feelings of resentment and sympathy toward blacks were strongly
associated with the vote: racially resentful whites voted decisively for Proposal 2
while racially sympathetic whites voted decisively against Proposal 2. No other fac-
tor was as important. Moreover, the relationship between sympathy and resentment,
on the one hand, and vote on Proposal 2, on the other, was significantly stronger than
the parallel relationship between sympathy and resentment and vote on a hypothetical
ballot initiative worded identically to Proposal 2 posed simultaneously to a national
sample. The results are similar for black voters, though not as striking. Among black
voters, feelings of racial group solidarity were significantly associated with the vote:
racially identified blacks voted overwhelmingly against Proposal 2, while blacks
less psychologically tied to their racial group were less lopsidedly opposed to Proposal
2. This relationship remains when other political factors are taken into account.
Racial solidarity was the most important factor in the black vote on Proposal 2. And
finally, the relationship between racial solidarity and the vote on Proposal 2 was
stronger (though not significantly so) than the parallel relationship between racial
solidarity and vote on a hypothetical ballot initiative worded identically to Proposal
2 posed to a national sample.
III. AFTER SCHUETTE
Schuette attracted a large amount of public attention during briefing and argu-
ment due to its high stakes, with statewide bans of affirmative action hanging in the
balance both in Michigan and across the country.242 Following the Court’s reversal of
the Sixth Circuit, however, the case has largely receded from public view. We conclude
242 See Michael Kagan, “Unelected Faculty”: Schuette v. Coalition and the Limits of
Academic Freedom, 5 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 286, 286 (2014).
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by briefly considering the ramifications of Schuette—for affirmative action, for the
political process doctrine, and for the antibalkanization principle.
The implications for the practice of affirmative action itself seem minimal. Early
in Schuette, Kennedy wrote: “Before the Court addresses the question presented, it is
important to note what this case is not about. It is not about the constitutionality, or
the merits, of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education.”243 Two years
after Schuette, the Supreme Court held that the University of Texas at Austin’s affir-
mative action program survived strict scrutiny and upheld it.244 Notably, neither the
majority opinion nor the two dissenting opinions so much as mentioned Schuette.245
The implications for the political process doctrine seem minor as well. If before
Schuette the cases articulating the political process doctrine were “jurisprudential
enigmas that seem to lack any coherent relationship to constitutional doctrine as a
whole,”246 after it they were more so. If both Kennedy’s revision of the doctrine and his
characterization of Hunter247 and Seattle248 hold, “[t]he doctrine would only apply when
voters overturn government policy meant to mitigate an unambiguous ‘racial injury’
identified by the Court.”249 The category is likely nonexistent, leaving the political pro-
cess doctrine “in essence defunct,”250 resting in the graveyard alongside other doctrines
created to advance civil rights objectives while avoiding addressing racism directly.
In one sense, however, Kennedy’s language about the political process doctrine251
came down at an auspicious time. In June 2013, the Supreme Court struck down
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, which violated the Due Process Clause
by treating a subset of state-sanctioned marriages unequally—those of same-sex
couples.252 For the following twenty-four months, lower courts and ultimately the
Supreme Court grappled with whether United States v. Windsor’s253 holding rendered
state-level bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional, concluding when the Supreme
Court held that they did in Obergefell v. Hodges.254
The facts of Schuette were strikingly analogous to the Court’s debate over gay mar-
riage. It involved a state ballot initiative that sought to amend the state’s constitution.255
243 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1630 (2014) (plu-
rality opinion).
244 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016).
245 See generally id.
246 David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147
U. PA. L. REV. 487, 561 (1999).
247 See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text.
249 Bernstein, supra note 99, at 283.
250 Id.
251 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637 (2014)
(plurality opinion).
252 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).
253 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (explaining the Windsor holding).
254 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
255 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629 (plurality opinion).
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The amendment prevented the state from giving a benefit to a historically disadvan-
taged minority group.256 The parties contested whether the amendment was driven
by animus for the group itself, not its purported policy goal.257 The issue sparked
disagreement on the appropriateness of judicial intervention into a raging political
debate.258 Kennedy’s language on the antibalkanizing merits of resolving disputes
through the political process dropped in April 2014, in the throes of lower court liti-
gation interpreting Windsor.259
It is therefore no surprise that litigants defending gay marriage bans quickly
seized on the language of Schuette. Attorneys representing Wisconsin told the Seventh
Circuit that Schuette affirmed “the importance of settling policy disputes through
public debate and the ballot box.”260 Attorneys for Louisiana told the Fifth Circuit
that affirmative action and gay marriage were such analogous issues that “Schuette
sp[oke] directly to the issue of state authority here.”261 Attorneys for Tennessee quoted
to the Sixth Circuit Schuette’s language on animus, that it would be “demeaning to
the democratic process to presume that the voters are not capable of deciding an
issue of this sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.”262
And indeed, while most courts in the aftermath of Windsor found gay marriage
bans to be unconstitutional, the courts that upheld them virtually all cited to Schuette
in doing so.263 The Sixth Circuit cited Schuette’s language against presuming animus,
writing that “[w]hat the Court recently said about another statewide initiative that
people care passionately about applies with equal vigor here.”264 The District Court
of Puerto Rico cited Schuette’s antibalkanizing language at length in upholding its
gay marriage ban.265 The Eastern District of Louisiana did so as well, noting that the
gay marriage “case shares striking similarities with Schuette.”266
256 Id. (“Under the terms of the amendment, race-based preferences cannot be part of the
admissions process for state universities.”).
257 In its reply brief, the Office of the Attorney General noted that while respondents
believed Michigan voters acted with discriminatory animus, Section 26 actually discrimi-
nates against discrimination. Reply Brief at 3, Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (No. 12-682).
258 See Kagan, supra note 242, at 286.
259 See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629–38 (plurality opinion).
260 Wisconsin State Defendants’ Reply Brief at 25, Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982
(W.D. Wis. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-
2526).
261 Brief of Appellees at 22, Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 791 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2015)
(No. 14-31037).
262 Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 23–24, Tanco v. Halsam, No. 14-5297 (6th Cir.
May 7, 2014) (citing Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1637) (plurality opinion)).
263 See infra notes 264–66 and accompanying text.
264 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 409 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d sub. nom. Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
265 Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, 54 F. Supp. 3d 157, 168 (D.P.R. 2014).
266 Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 927 n.20 (E.D. La. 2014).
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Schuette’s fourteen months of prominence ended in June 2015, when the Court
decided Obergefell, establishing the unconstitutionality of the gay marriage bans.267
Confronted with his earlier ode to the democratic process, Kennedy wrote that
Schuette affirmed that “democracy is the appropriate process for change,” but only
“so long as that process does not abridge fundamental rights.”268 “Thus, when the
rights of persons are violated, ‘the Constitution requires redress by the courts,’
notwithstanding the more general value of democratic decisionmaking. This holds
true even when protecting individual rights affects issues of the utmost importance
and sensitivity.”269
The Schuette plaintiffs would likely find this distinction to be mystifying, as
they believed their fundamental rights were violated—their right to equal access to
the political process.270 The Court seemed to truly be invoking the distinction that
divided lower court judges on Schuette itself—that whether the case was fundamen-
tally about protecting a fundamental right, equal access to the political process, turned
on whether the amendment was delivering race-based benefits or protecting race-
based equality.271 Perhaps more notable, however, was that the Court in Obergefell
rejected the antibalkanization frame, finding that fundamental rights had to be pro-
tected regardless of their effect on important and sensitive issues.272
Each of the four dissenting justices wrote separately, and two cited to Schuette
as support.273 Roberts closely emulated Kennedy’s antibalkanizing arguments from
Schuette.274 He gestured to broad antibalkanization principles, writing: “Stealing this
issue from the people will for many cast a cloud over same-sex marriage, making a
dramatic social change that much more difficult to accept.”275 But he also proceeded
to make one of the same empirical claims as Kennedy: “There will be consequences
to shutting down the political process on an issue of such profound public signifi-
cance. Closing debate tends to close minds. People denied a voice are less likely to
accept the ruling.”276 Yet this invocation of the merits of antibalkanization did not
carry the day.
The future of Schuette’s vitality is unclear. Its complete absence in Fisher II277
suggests that the courts do not find it relevant to the debate over the merits of affir-
mative action. With the exception of the gay marriage cases, it has gone virtually
267 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
268 Id. at 2605.
269 Id. (quoting Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637
(2014) (plurality opinion)).
270 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629–30 (plurality opinion).
271 Id. at 1639.
272 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605.
273 Id. at 2624 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2627 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
274 Id. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
275 Id.
276 Id. at 2625.
277 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
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uncited in the Supreme Court or even the federal courts of appeals since its publica-
tion, demonstrating a lack of vitality in the political process doctrine, perhaps even
preceding Schuette and certainly after it. The antibalkanizing language received its
flurry of attention, but its failure to carry the day in Obergefell suggests that the
antibalkanization principles of Schuette may be little more than another “ad hoc
compromise[ ]” to be invoked by the Court when it is comfortable denying protected
rights to minority groups, even when empirically incorrect.278
CONCLUSION
Kennedy’s controlling plurality opinion in Schuette followed a long line of Equal
Protection cases in suggesting the relevance of antibalkanization values.279 Kennedy
found the campaign around Proposal 2, and its outcome being upheld by the courts,
to further these antibalkanization values.280
Our empirical analysis finds the opposite. Proposal 2 and its campaign appeared
both to undermine social cohesion and stoke racial antagonism.281 Feelings of racial re-
sentment among whites and racial solidarity among blacks powerfully predicted the
vote.282 Proposal 2 became a referendum not on the merits of a policy, aided by delib-
erate and rational debate, as Kennedy assumed. It was rather and primarily a case of
racial tribalism, African Americans and whites deeply divided over the way forward.
278 See Bagenstos, supra note 130, at 417.
279 See supra Part I.
280 See supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text.
281 See supra Tables 3–6 and accompanying text.
282 See supra Tables 3–6 and accompanying text.
